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PREVENTION AND REMEDIATION OF POLICE EXCESSIVE 
FORCE AND SIMILAR COMPLAINTS  
Russel K. Osgood* 
I. 
 
This Article, like many, started with a narrow focus. Because I believe 
that the substantive criminal law is an ineffective, frequently inapposite 
and blunt instrument, it strikes me that any proposal to reduce or eliminate 
excessive police force,1 and related complaints by some alteration(s) of 
substantive or procedural aspects of the criminal law, will not work.2 I 
believe part of this is in part a function of the fact that we have fifty-two 
systems of criminal law and procedure in the United States, and even more 
sub-systems based on local conditions.3 In addition, we have 
multitudinous police, fire, and sheriff jurisdictions and structures.  
 
*   © All Rights Reserved. Visiting Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. 
The author thanks Landon J. Francois, Class of 2022, for excellent research assistance. 
1.   In general, this Article will focus on allegations of improper use of force in a racial context 
but in recent months a number of suits have been filed against police use of force in the context of 
otherwise lawful demonstrations against excessive use of force and there is no reason that the changes 
and procedures suggested below should not be applicable in such context. See, e.g., Rachel Droze, 
Lawsuit: BLM Activist Alleges Police, City of Des Moines Violated Her Civil Rights and Used Excessive 
Force When Arresting Her, WE ARE IOWA WOI-DT ONLINE (Jan. 5, 2021, 2:27 AM), 
https://www.weareiowa.com/article/news/community/black-lives-matter-liberation-movement-blm-
activist-suing-city-des-moines-dmpd-police-department-officers-protests-george-floyd/524-a9b25124-
51ad-482d-8768-916b4172256e [https://perma.cc/MUY7-ZCRS].  
2.   This is not to say that no one is convicted criminally for using excessive force. The tragic 
killing of the teenaged William Chapman in Portsmouth, Virginia led to the conviction for voluntary 
manslaughter of Officer Stephen Rankin in 2016. See Verdict Reached for Former Officer Accused in 
Black Teen’s Killing, CBS NEWS (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/stephen-rankin-
william-chapman-verdict-reached/ [https://perma.cc/FG9N-SKC2]. At the same time in several of these 
cases, like the case of Michael Brown, the St. Louis grand jury refused to indict Officer Darren Wilson 
who resigned apparently without any disciplinary proceeding. The refusal to indict was reviewed by a 
new St. Louis County prosecutor, Wesley Bell, who declined to move forward also based on his reading 
of the grand jury minutes which were released for public scrutiny. See infra note 10. 
3.   Many states’ criminal laws do not spell out rules for police use of force or do so in an 
incomplete manner. One of the most comprehensive attempts is to be found in Article 35 (Defense of 
Justification) of the New York State Penal Law. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (McKinney 2019). New 
York attempts, it seems, to articulate common sense standards (there are one or two exceptions to this 
to be found in Article 35). But even this attempt is incomplete and has been in effect during a series of 

















Because I believe that reforming the substantive and procedural law of 
crimes will not work to solve the problem of excessive use of force,4 and is 
also unwieldy, my main proposal was going to be devising and applying 
better police disciplinary procedures.5 Currently, I think it is fair to say that 
many jurisdictions do not have even a basic disciplinary system in place that 
works, especially with respect to allegations of excessive force.6 But it is 
 
high profile claims of police use of excessive force almost all of which ended without a decision to 
prosecute and without discipline being imposed. I do not mean to imply that all allegations of excessive 
use of force are correct, but the anecdotal evidence suggests what most people believe about most cases, 
e.g., that it is extremely difficult to convict or discipline a police office for use of excessive force because 
of the great deference given to police action by prosecutors, jurors, grand jurors, and police dominated 
disciplinary review mechanisms. The tremendous legal confusion surrounding the death of Ahmaud 
Arbery in Georgia is illustrative. Ahmaud Arbery Shooting: A Timeline of the Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 
24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/6AF6-
HQ9E].  
4.   As discussed infra, there have been a variety of proposals to remove the handling of police 
prosecutions from the hands of local prosecutors and, for instance, place it in the hands of a special 
prosecutor or the state’s attorney general. See, e.g., Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016); Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring 
Trust and Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 
137 (2015). In saying that I do not believe the substantive criminal law and procedure will likely be 
effective at controlling excessive uses of force by the police, I am not saying that that law should be 
changed in any way to make assault, homicide, and related offenses not be available to a prosecutor in 
dealing with a case of possible police excessive use of force.  
5.   One of the most thoughtful discussions of issues with respect to disciplinary procedures 
containing many helpful suggestions is a publication of the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of 
Government’s Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management. DARREL W. STEPHENS, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICE DISCIPLINE: A CASE FOR CHANGE (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/234052.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXF4-F63U]. See infra note 28.  
6.   The widely publicized case of the death of Eric Garner in New York City on July 17, 2014, 
caused by Officer Daniel Pantaleo is an exception. Following the refusal of a New York grand jury to 
indict Officer Pantaleo NYPD instituted a disciplinary proceeding against him. This proceeding led to 
his termination as a police officer and the stripping away of his pension. See Timeline of Key Events in 
Eric Garner Chokehold Death, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 16, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/ec7ac5
a664d74cdab852d639c0da08f4 [https://perma.cc/6MYM-GZHC]. The Louisville police department 
sought to terminate two officers, one of whom applied for the no-knock search warrant and the other 
who fired the shot that killed Breonna Taylor. The Department had previously fired the officer who 
sprayed ten rounds into Breonna Taylor’s apartment. Tessa Duvall, Darcy Costello & Bailey Loosemore, 
Louisville Police Seek to Fire 2 More Officers Connected to Fatal Shooting of Breonna Taylor, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 31, 2020, 11:26 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/12/29/breonn
a-taylor-death-louisville-police-seek-fire-another-detective/4081400001 [https://perma.cc/R4NU-
6AXQ]. The officers in question were subjected to a termination hearing on January 4, 2021. See Dylan 
Lovan, Detectives in Breonna Taylor Case Face Termination Hearing, PBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2021, 1:29 
PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/police-officers-in-breonna-taylor-case-face-termination-
hearing [https://perma.cc/AA3B-DZVH]. The officers were subsequently terminated. See David K. Li, 
2 Louisville Police Officers Fired Over Roles in Fatal Shooting of Breonna Taylor, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 
2021, 5:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/2-louisville-police-officers-fired-over-roles-


















also true that those with disciplinary systems (typically large police forces), 
have found them to be ineffective due to police mismanagement and 
timidity or union7 domination. Practical difficulties also exist in devising 
adjudicatory mechanisms that provide knowledgeable decision making 
about community sensitivities,8 crime and police practices without 
becoming captive to one perspective or another.9 A further problem with 
placing heavy reliance on police disciplinary procedures to handle excessive 
force complaints is that many of these procedures provide that a proceeding 
under it must abate if the officer resigns.10 
 
officers can be fired quickly and without a disciplinary proceeding in some cases. 
7.   Myself and many others are critical of police union domination of disciplinary procedures 
and also of a seemingly blind defense of police misconduct or worse. I understand that frequently a 
union representative is the only one a police officer can turn to in a moment of crisis with respect to a 
claim of excessive force. This function of the union is a good thing but is to be distinguished from turning 
over directly or indirectly the levers of power in a disciplinary process to an individual or entity with an 
inherent conflict of interest.   
8.   In the long and widespread debate during the 1960s and 1970s about the wisdom and 
parameters of establishing Civilian (wholly or partially) Review Boards to review police functioning, 
one of the most vexed issues was how to find civilians (if they exist) with the expertise to review police 
functioning and the corollary fear that these boards would be captured by anti-police factions. See 
generally Kelly McConney Moore, For Civilian Review Boards to Work, They Must Avoid Past 
Mistakes, ACLU CONN. (Sept. 10, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.acluct.org/en/news/civilian-review-
boards-work-they-must-avoid-past-mistakes [https://perma.cc/7RTS-QTCA]. As recently as this year, a 
major city, Portland, Oregon, in the midst of major civil unrest, had under consideration the creation of 
a Community Police Oversight Board which could not include any past or present police or their family 
members but should include particularly people who have experienced racism, mental illness, addiction 
or alcoholism. The proposed Board was to be given very broad investigative powers over the Portland 
Police Bureau. The City of Baltimore has one of the most unbalanced CRB structure. See Civilian 
Review Board, OFFICE OF EQUITY & C.R. OF BALT., MD., https://civilrights.baltimorecity.gov/civilian-
review-board [https://perma.cc/MB97-3857]. 
9.   See generally RON SAFER, KISH KHEMANI & JAMES O’KEEFE, PREVENTING AND 
DISCIPLINING POLICE MISCONDUCT: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCERNING CHICAGO’S POLICE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM (2014), https://www.chicago.gov/content/da
m/city/progs/safety/Preventing_Disciplining_Police_Misconduct_Dec_2014.pdf[https://perma.cc/J6QJ
-684K]. 
10.   Officer Darren Wilson resigned from the St. Louis police force while the criminal 
investigation of the shooting of Michael Brown was pursued (twice at the state level and then federally 
also). See Joel Currier, St. Louis County Prosecutor Reopened Michael Brown Shooting Case But Won’t 
Charge Darren Wilson, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (July 31, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-county-
prosecutor-reopened-michael-brown-shooting-case-but-wont-charge-darren-wilson/article_8e537a12-
4dd0-51d8-a325-11ba7dddd20e.html [https://perma.cc/8YSU-TFNX]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN 
BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/def
ault/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf 

















The case of George Floyd11 in Minneapolis is on point. Floyd’s death 
by asphyxiation on May 25, 2020, was caused by Officer Derek Chauvin (a 
nineteen-year veteran of the Minneapolis police force) kneeling on his neck, 
for almost nine minutes, in the absence of a visible threat to Officer Chauvin 
or his three fellow police officers who sought to detain Floyd. Minneapolis 
has had a sophisticated policy disciplinary procedure in place for more than 
eight years.12 It is more intricate and thoughtful than most, and yet the 
officer who held George Floyd down causing his death had been the subject 
of numerous complaints and interactions,13 including one14 that resembles 
in seriousness of facts in the George Floyd case. Yet Officer Chauvin was 
still on duty and tasked with the apprehension of people like George Floyd. 
On April 20, 2021, Derek Chauvin was found guilty of unintentional 
second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree 
 
[https://perma.cc/NBW7-ZG4V]. Some states, Michigan for example, provide that once an investigation 
has begun, an officer’s resignation does not obviate the possibility that a record will be available for 
future employers to review. See Law Enforcement Officer Separation of Service Record Act, MICH. 
COMP. LAWS §§ 28.561–
.565 (2020), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(l40neuypsta3nn1zb5ze403r))/mileg.aspx?page=getObje
ct&objectName=mcl-Act-128-of-2017 [https://perma.cc/5YFZ-94H7]. 
11.   There is a fair amount of misinformation about Officer Derek Chauvin and what has 
happened to him following George Floyd’s death. He was fired on May 26, 2020. He was charged on 
May 29, 2020 with three counts of homicide, one of which was later dismissed. State v. Chauvin, No. 
27-CR-20-12646, 2020 WL 6270693, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 2020). Wilson was found guilty of 
unintentional second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter; see infra 
Note 16. 
12.   See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDS. Ch. 172 n.3 (2021 Supp. 62 Update 7) (adopted Sept. 
21, 2012), https://library.municode.com/mn/minneapolis/codes/code_of_ordinances/376408?nodeId=C
OOR_TIT9FIPOPR_CH172POCOOV (amending chapter title from “Civilian Police Review 
Authority” to “Police Conduct Oversight”) [https://perma.cc/SB5N-2N8H]. The Hennepin County 
District Court ruled on January 12, 2021 that former Officer Chauvin would be tried separately from the 
other officers for homicide related offenses. Chao Xiong, Derek Chauvin Will Be Tried Separately in 
Death of George Floyd, STARTRIBUNE (Jan. 13, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.startribune.com/derek-
chauvin-will-be-tried-separately-in-death-of-george-floyd/600009598/ [https://perma.cc/3U5G-
HYGD]. 
13.   See Shaila Dewan & Serge F. Kovaleski, Thousands of Complaints Do Little to Change 
Police Ways, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/derek-chauvin-
george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/YQ5V-8CAQ]. 
14.   See Officer Charged in George Floyd’s Death Used Fatal Force Before and Had History 




















manslaughter.15 He has since requested a new trial and will likely appeal the 
decision.16 
A further problem with the idea of devising and implementing a better 
police disciplinary system is the multiplicity and variability of United States 
police and sheriff departments. There are around 18,000 such departments;17 
many are very small, too small to accommodate staff and administer 
sophisticated police disciplinary mechanism. This is not to say that larger 
departments should not try to devise and operate better disciplinary systems, 
but even they are subject to capture, union domination, and lack of 
knowledge and expertise. And of course, all of this leaves the many small 
or medium sized systems without much of a disciplinary procedure. 
So, with the criminal law and police disciplinary systems offering only 
partial and frequently weak controls, what alternative approaches are there? 
Many have argued that the core problem is systemic racism in the social 
order and on police forces. Those who espouse this position then offer little 
except canned schemes for sensitivity and implicit bias training that seem 
unlikely to have a direct impact or even be implemented.18 Those strategies 
also frequently have little impact and, even worse, become the subject of 
derision due to their lack of sophistication or practical focus.19 
 
15.   Wamsley, Derek Chauvin Found Guilty of George Floyd’s Murder, NPR, (Apr. 20, 2021), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killing-of-george-floyd/2021/04/20/987777911/court-says-
jury-has-reached-verdict-in-derek-chauvins-murder-trial [https://perma.cc/GM4B-L8MJ].  
16.   Derek Chauvin: ex-officer convicted in George Floyd’s murder asks for new trial, THE 
GUARDIAN, (May 4, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/may/04/derek-chauvin-
george-floyd-new-trial [https://perma.cc/KTT3-ZW2G]. 
17.   DUREN BANKS, JOSHUA HENDRIX, MATTHEW HICKMAN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
EMPLOYMENT DATA (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CPQ-
DFCH].  
18.   See generally Martin Kaste, NYPD Study: Implicit Bias Training Changes Minds, Not 
Necessarily Behavior, NPR, (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/10/909380525/nypd-study-
implicit-bias-training-changes-minds-not-necessarily-behavior [https://perma.cc/LG85-3D2H]; Belinda 
Luscome, She Wrote a Book About Bias. Here’s How She Thinks Police Departments Should Approach 
Reform, TIME IDEAS, (June 8, 2020), https://time.com/5849172/police-racial-
bias/ [https://perma.cc/SX64-T5CL]. 
19.   See generally Tiffany L. Green & Nao Hagiwara, The Problem with Implicit Bias 
Training, SCI. AM., (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-problem-with-
implicit-bias-training/ [https://perma.cc/WU93-4LU9]; Abby Tang & Michelle Yan Huang, The 
problem with implicit bias trainings, BUS. INSIDER, (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/
implicit-bias-trainings-imperfect-should-we-stop-them-2020-7 [https://perma.cc/2G6A-PF8V]; Jesse 
Singal, Psychology’s Favorite Tool for Measuring Racism Isn’t Up to the Job, N.Y. MAG.: THE CUT, 
(Jan. 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/01/psychologys-racism-measuring-tool-isnt-up-to-the-
job.html [https://perma.cc/F2U8-DPXM]. 



















I believe that the only viable solution is to mandate some form of a 
statewide or regional20 police force structure with better training, higher 
educational requirements for officer entry, less of a militarized appearance 
and modus operandi, and more of a superstructure for review and discipline 
of issues with respect to claims for excessive force and related problems 
such as unjustified racial disparities in stops, arrests, charging and 
sentencing. The cost effect of such a change might well be the opposite of 
defunding the police.  
As an important parenthetical, one cannot underestimate the difficulties 
in identifying and measuring unfair patterns in all of these areas of police 
activity.21 Mere racial disparities, while evidence, may not be conclusive 
 
20.   One of the major issues that needs addressing is who supervises the police in the United 
States. Some cities have police boards or commissions and some report to a mayor. I favor having the 
police report directly to a politically accountable official. In connection with the proposal made here 
although there is a lot to be said for regional police systems such systems usually span a number of 
political boundaries and there is, therefore, no single politically accountable official for such a regional 
police system to report to. One could imagine in a large state like California have several regions, all 
reporting to the governor. In smaller states a unified police authority would report to the governor. What 
would be undesirable is to have the police report to someone who is not accountable. The proposal being 
made does not mean that local supervision of everyday aspects of police operations would be eliminated 
but it would, especially in medium to small jurisdictions give supervisors more of a structure above them 
to both support and review such local supervision. 
21.   There have been a number of efforts to measure and document racial disparities in 
policing. The leading study of high quality by Roland Fryer, an Economics Professor at Harvard, in 2018 
found that there is a fifty-percent differential in the likelihood that African-American and Hispanics will 
experience some form of force during interactions with the police. Roland G. Fryer, An Empirical 
Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force 3–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 
No. 22399, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22399/w22399.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L9ST-D353]. At the same time, the Fryer study found that there were no racial 
differences in the rate at which African Americans and Hispanics were involved in shootings in 
connection with such an interaction. Id. There are a number of problems in measurement. First, African-
Americans tend to live in highly urbanized areas which tend to have more crime and also more effective 
policing of crime (more arrests, convictions, and longer sentences). See Parker, Horowitz, Brown, Fry, 
Cohn & Igielnik, What Unites and Divides Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities, PEW RSCH. CTR., 
(May 22, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/05/22/demographic-and-economic-
trends-in-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities/ [https://perma.cc/HN86-C33V]. Second, even 
though poverty rates have been trending downwards, “the share of Blacks in poverty was 1.8 times 
greater than their share among the general population” in 2020; a higher crime rate in more impoverished 
groups is not surprising. John Creamer, Inequalities Persist Despite Decline in Poverty For All Major 
Race and Hispanic Origin Groups, U.S. Census Bureau, (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.census.gov/libr
ary/stories/2020/09/poverty-rates-for-blacks-and-hispanics-reached-historic-lows-in-
2019.html [https://perma.cc/MJ5P-7KYX]. Third, and finally, high rates of criminal activity occur in 


















given variations in types of crimes across racial and geographic lines. A 
major goal is of course to inhibit or rule out invidious, e.g., racially 
motivated,22 differentials in the deployment of unjustified force, stops, 
arrests, and sentencing. These additional aspects of unfair police behavior 
further show why a disciplinary procedure standing alone is inadequate no 
matter how well devised.  
In determining ways to identify and measure invidious differentials in 
police practices in other areas of the law, sometimes, if a significant 
differential is discerned, the burden of proof23 is flipped back onto the entity 
or individual accused of the practices. But this flipping is potentially 
unreliable or unfair, particularly as it relates to an officer’s employment. 
First, one must agree on what the comparison data is. Second, in some cases, 
neighborhoods, regions, or races are characterized by a higher or lower 
incidence of a particular crime. Whites may disproportionately commit 
embezzlement, rural people may disproportionately commit certain types of 
thefts, and urbanized populations may in fact engage in more armed 
robberies or may disproportionately commit random violence.24  
What I propose is a very tall order, the statewide or regional25 
reorganization of all police structures. This would face all kinds of legal, 
practical and constitutional barriers. Existing police forces would be swept 
aside and that will produce enormous resistance. One thing that might soften 
this resistance would be to organize police forces within the context of our 
states (or compacted groups of states).26 Focusing on the state level would 
allow some states to move forward without 100% participation by all the 
states, and without constitutionally suspect27 federal one-size-fits-all 
 
likely in urban areas. Family Life and Delinquency and Crime: A Policymakers’ Guide to the Literature, 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., (Jan. 15, 1993), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/140517NCJRS.pdf.  
22.   Police bias is also possible and to be controlled if aimed at teenagers or males.  
23.   Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
24.   For a breakdown of various offenses by race, see Law Enforcement & Juvenile Crime, 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, (2019), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr.asp?
table_in=2 [https://perma.cc/8ZVC-QNKP]. For a breakdown of urban and rural crime divide, see 2019 
Crime in the United States, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.: FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2019), 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/tables/table-18 
[https://perma.cc/49FY-PRPE]; see also Weisheit, Falcone & Wells, Rural Crime and Rural Policing, 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS (1994), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles/rcrp.pdf. 
25.   See generally supra note 21. 
26.   There are of course vast and complex state-to-state differences among the stated statutory 
and constitutional aspects of law enforcement organization.  
27.   See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  

















legislation. At the same time the current multiplicitiousness of police 
structures and entities lead to a radical discontinuity in police practices, 
effectiveness, and quality. This might be tolerable if important 
considerations of social cohesion and racial fairness were not uppermost in 
people’s minds as more fully discussed below.     
It is worth noting that a more broadly organized system of police entities 
would have other advantages for communities and individual officers. 
Police would not be tightly tied to a single location or system in a state. 
Their training would be relevant within whatever larger structure the police 
organization obtains, and it would allow easier transfers for any reason. It 
would create more of a system of professional promotion for police. 
Communities would benefit from occasional change (and less stagnation) 
but of course easier transfers would require training as to the social (and if 
across state lines the legal) terrain of a new jurisdiction. Caspar, Wyoming 




Changing police structures is a big step towards better handling of 
excessive force allegations (whether racially discriminatory or not) and 
other claims of invidious discrimination in policing. It should be noted that 
broadening the structural base will still mean that there will need to be a 
disciplinary procedure in place, one that probably will resemble some of the 
better crafted procedures that exist today.28 At the same time, it is my belief 
that the details of such a disciplinary process are less significant than the 
structure of police organization and the personnel who administer the 
process.  
An ideal state-wide or regional police disciplinary procedure should, at 
a minimum, have the following features: (1) a description of behaviors that 
might lead to discipline,29 (2) an adjudicatory tribunal composed of three 
 
28.   Although it has some significant flaws, the Minneapolis procedure is an example of one 
that is generally thoughtfully drafted. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDS. Ch. 172 (2021 Supp. 62 Update 
7), https://library.municode.com/mn/minneapolis/codes/code_of_ordinances/376408?nodeId=COOR_
TIT9FIPOPR_CH172POCOOV [https://perma.cc/SB5N-2N8H]. 
29.   The U.S. Military has historically imposed sanctions under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice for “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” 10 U.S.C. § 933. This standard has proven 
to be less workable in a more diverse and heterogeneous society, and the absence of a standard in older 



















individuals, including at least one expert on policing not drawn from the 
local area and with no ties to the officer being investigated,30 (3) decisions 
of the tribunal would require the concurrence of only two members, (4) the 
burden of proof required for a determination of a violation would be by clear 
and convincing evidence,31 (5) the third tribunal member should be from the 
local area of the source of any complaint but should not represent any 
particular advocacy organization including the police force or any collective 
bargaining representative,32 (6) local courts possessing nationwide service 
of process powers by federal legislation should have the power to compel 
the production of evidence and the attendance of witnesses, (7) the 
proceeding should be governed by rules similar to the rules governing 
arbitrations including arbitral rules of evidence,33 and (8) the proceeding 
may commence and/or continue after the resignation of the target of the 
investigation, not to administer discipline but to create a record for future 
employers and others.  
As a concomitant to the foregoing suggestions, all records of charges 
and disciplinary proceedings should be permanent public records. One of 
the major complaints against many existing disciplinary procedures is that 
either records are not kept or else they are not publicly available.34 At the 
 
30.   Advocates for greater vigilance against excessive force will no doubt object to the 
composition of the board. My view is that the two extremes we see in current proposals, heavily police 
oriented versus heavily interest group/community oriented, are likely to lead to erroneous determinations 
or at least more controversy with respect to the cases involved. Expertise in policing is absolutely 
necessary for the fair judgment of officers whose careers may be ended and disinterest judgment is 
absolutely necessary to maintain police credibility. 
31.   It is probable that advocates for greater harshness in the treatment of excessive force 
violations will object to this. My reason for including this is that an officer’s livelihood and occupation 
are at stake. A determination that an officer used excessive force is likely a career ending event even if 
the sanction imposed is lower than dismissal.  
32.   This is the opposite of the approach in the more recent version of Baltimore’s civilian 
review board. See OFFICE OF EQUITY & C.R. OF BALT., MD., supra note 8. 
33.   See AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMP. ARB. RULES AND MEDIATION PROC. (2009), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/EmploymentRules_Web_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDA6-K8NR].  
34.   See Jason Clayworth & Andrea May Sahouri, Wall of Protection: How Hundreds of Iowa 
Police Complaints Stay Secret, DES MOINES REGISTER (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.desmoinesregister
.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2021/01/10/des-moines-iowa-police-officer-misconduct-records-
secret/3976034001/; available at https://www.desmoinesregister.com. Following the refusal of the St 
Louis County grand jury to indict Officer Darren Wilson and the huge public uproar, the St. Louis 
County Prosecutor Robert McCulloch released most of the grand jury testimony (which is usually held 
secretly in Missouri). See Documents from the Ferguson Grand Jury, CNN (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/11/us/ferguson-grand-jury-docs/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/5R3M-2SCY]. 

















same time, I do not believe that police disciplinary proceedings should be 
open to the public because they are not criminal proceedings rather they are 
in the nature of employment decisions. Because these are in the nature of 
employment decisions each side should bear its own legal fees except, as in 
trusts and estates proceedings, I would give the arbitrators the power to 
award attorneys’ fees to an officer if they find that the disciplinary 
proceeding was brought without a reasonable foundation in the facts of the 
matter. 
Finally, and most importantly, an ideal police disciplinary procedure 
should identify the range of possible sanctions and give some indication of 
when the highest and lowest sanctions should be imposed. The highest 
sanction is obviously dismissal and elimination of pension and other post-
retirement accrued benefits, which should be reserved for purposeful and 
intentional deaths or serious bodily harm. But dismissal without removal of 
benefits should be the putative sanction for any other use of excessive force 
causing death or serious bodily injury.35 Sanctions should begin at the 
lowest level include permanently filed letters of reprimand, restitution (by 
payment or by an offset to any future pay) for stolen property or improperly 
billed hours,36 suspension without pay, mandatory training, reassignment 
away from patrol duties, reductions of pay or grade, denial of promotion, 
and other disciplinary remedies. Having said this, it is clear that it is 
impossible to expound a 100% fully reticulated list of offenses with pre-set, 
tailored sanctions because the facts and circumstances may suggest either 
lenity or severity in punishment just as in criminal sentencing, civil rights 
violations or civil assessment of damages. It should also be clear under such 
rules that a determination and imposition of a sanction in such a proceeding 
does not eliminate the possibility of a criminal conviction tort or other civil 
liability.37 
 
35.   “Excessive” force obviously requires some level of intention even in this latter case like 
recklessness or a high degree of negligence but would not include purely accidental (e.g., non or low-
level negligent) deaths or serious injuries.  
36.   Massachusetts has pursued a significant number of state police officers for falsely inflating 
working hours. 
Former Massachusetts State Police Troopers Charged with Conspiracy to Embezzle Overtime 
Funds and Wire Fraud, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE DIST. OF MASS. (Dec. 11, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-massachusetts-state-police-troopers-charged-conspiracy-
embezzle-overtime-funds-and [https://perma.cc/AFU9-8QBX].  
37.   One complex sub-issue is whether the disciplinary sanction can strip away any immunity 


















So, why will anything change if my suggestions on disciplinary 
procedures are adopted? The answer is that such an enlarged police structure 
will: (1) provide more resources and a deeper staff to handle such 
allegations within the disciplinary procedure, (2) make it easier to find non-
involved but expert adjudicators, and (3) remove the decisions (depending 
on how the procedure is structured) from the hands of people close to the 
officer being investigated and from the community in which the alleged 
excessive force occurred. 
But these changes should be accompanied by other changes. One 
feature of a more unified police structure should be to reduce the appearance 
of militarization of the police,38 by way of new types of uniforms,39 and 
reduced deployment of deadly weapons on regular patrols. It will remain 
true that citizens need to be able to generally identify officers out on patrol 
to add deterrence and build trust. Related to this, today in urban and 
suburban areas police overwhelmingly are seated in cruisers while on call 
whether driving around or parked.40 Where possible, police should be on 
foot, on bicycles, or on motorized vehicles like scooters to be visible and to 
be able to build trust and reliance in communities. In rural areas, patrol cars 
are indispensable, but police should endeavor to be visible in venues where 
gather, like in schools or public parks.  
Along with a change in the appearance of policing, we should undertake 
a widespread effort to educate children and adults about policing and the 
law. This should be focused on male students particularly those between the 
ages of twelve and eighteen. Various “police-in-the-schools” programs have 
 
away such liability protection retroactively and also as a matter of deterrence such immunity or liability 
protection should remain in place while an officer is employed to encourage police employers to work 
to prevent (in advance) excessive use of force by training, etc. 
38.   California has recently banned the wearing by police officers of military camouflage. 
California Lawmakers Approve 5 out of 7 Police Reform Bills, KUSI NEWS SAN DIEGO (Sept. 1, 2020), 
https://www.kusi.com/california-lawmakers-approve-5-out-of-7-police-reform-bills/ 
[https://perma.cc/K2DA-LDN8]. 
39.   It is interesting that police chiefs seem to always appear on television in a full-dress 
uniform sometimes with a holstered revolver. I am sure that these officers believe they are sending a 
message of being in charge, frequently in a crisis setting. But part of crisis management is the need to 
deescalate the sense of the crisis being out of control. It is curious that the detectives frequently behind 
the police chief are in suits or jackets or shirts with a badge.   
40.   On a cold, winter morning, January 3, 2021, while running at 5:30 am this author observed 
in two separate police jurisdictions two sets of squad cars parked (appositionally) so that the officers in 
the adjoining cars could chat.  

















been attempted and generally lacked staying power.41 This is in part because 
many large cities station police officers or school police officers in the 
schools for violence prevention purposes. What I am suggesting would not 
be a “police in the schools program,” but legal criminal education taught by 
regular instructors, and aimed at explaining the purposes and goals of the 
criminal law as opposed to police activities. 
Another set of initiatives would be in the area of more stable 
deployment of officers, particularly in urban and suburban areas, in smaller, 
consistent squad groups so officers know and understand each other and 
build camaraderie and esprit.42 These groups would report to a stable 
continuing intermediate level supervisor, a sergeant typically. The squad 
approach to policing has been a common suggestion, but has met fierce 
resistance from officers and unions because it reduces flexibility in 
assignments for many officers. But the problems we face require change 
and this resistance should be overcome.  
Finally, apparent racial disparities in the rate of stops and arrests, 
sentence length, and rates of incarceration should be further investigated 
and efforts should be devised to ameliorate them. The first thing that could 
be done is to make an officer’s proven pattern of racially motivated or 
otherwise discriminatory stops and arrests a disciplinary offense. 
Ameliorating the heavily disparate sentencing of African-Americans and to 
a lesser extent Hispanics—even if not overtly discriminatory—requires 
major changes in our overly complex and harsh sentencing rules. We have 
too many side constraints in sentencing, e.g., mandatory minimums, 
multiple enhancements, overlapping and redundant federal/state crimes, 
manufactured additive crimes (“armed criminal action” in Missouri43) 
which balloon the sentences typically for racial minorities and younger 
males even if not a racial minority.44 Finally, the federal Sentencing 
 
41.   For various criticisms of existing police activities in the schools, see Solutions, END ZERO 
TOLERANCE, https://www.endzerotolerance.org/police-in-schools-policy-
reforms [https://perma.cc/8T9A-B7HS]. The American Bar Association has a Division of Public 
Education which seeks to involve public schools and their teachers in educating about the role of law. 
See Division for Public Education, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_educ
ation/ [https://perma.cc/9R5V-WEQW].  
42.   See Safer et al., supra note 9, at 27–36. 
43.   MO. REV. STAT § 571.015 (2020), 
https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=571.015 [https://perma.cc/6528-VEGL].  
44.   Why are minorities and younger males most affected by these features? Many of them are 


















Guideline ranges are too high.45 Interestingly, our smaller, more rural states 
have generally not relied as heavily on such additive, punitive sentencing 
techniques. Thus, while there are likely institutional forces that will resist 
the structural changes proposed there are alternative possibilities that might 
be more acceptable. 
IV. 
 
It seems useful to pause at this point and say it would seem like I am 
proposing a massive organization change to deal with what is admittedly a 
big problem without any guarantee of success. But the proposal here would 
set in place a structure that, in the future, would be better able to devise new 
approaches to the problem that leads to this proposal. If the creation and 
implementation of more broadly-based police structures is to be undertaken, 
what will the federal role be and, similarly, how do we encourage states to 
move in this direction in light of major resistance? There have been 
proposals recently to encourage such reforms by using the federal spending 
power.46 The Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of 
Justice has issued a “Conciliation Handbook” to help communities 
experiencing conflict over claims of excessive force.47 But this well-
intentioned effort has obviously had limited efficacy during the numerous 
conflicts over this issue in recent years.  
 
robbery/burglary/larceny offenses committed while in possession of a weapon. See generally Federal 
Firearms Laws: Overview and Selected Legal Issues for the 116th Congress, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Mar. 
25, 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45629 [https://perma.cc/R5LD-NL68]; 
Muscarello v. United States, 523 U.S. 125, 132 (1998); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993); 
114 Conr. Rec. 22231 (1968). Many others are focused on repeat offenders particularly those who offend 
repetitiously within a fairly short period of time. Urban crime is disproportionately committed by 
minority members and theft type offenses are disproportionately committed by young males. See 
generally 2019 Crime in the United States Table 42, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.: FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, (2019), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-
pages/tables/table-42 [https://perma.cc/BN4Q-7RAH]; 2016 Crime in the United States Table 20, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUST.: FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-20 [https://perma.cc/CD4S-K53A]. 
45.   U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing table (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2010), https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2018-guidelines-manual/annotated-2018-chapter-5 
[https://perma.cc/YL6T-KBKJ]. 
46.   See Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform:Using 
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351 (2011); see also 
James P. Turner, Police Accountability in the Federal System, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 991 (1999).  
47.   COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., POLICE USE OF EXCESSIVE 
FORCE: A CONCILIATION HANDBOOK FOR THE POLICE AND THE CMTY. (2002), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/pdexcess.htm [https://perma.cc/BN2U-U5BY].  

















Further, it seems implausible to think that the states will accede to the 
removal of policing from their traditional control. A less drastic method for 
ensuring effective reviews of claims of excessive police force has been 
implemented in Iowa and Wisconsin.48 Iowa leaves the decision to 
prosecute with the county district attorney but the State’s Attorney General, 
the longest serving state attorney general in U.S. history, a Democrat, has 
been informally reviewing such cases since about 2004. Of the thirty cases 
his office has reviewed he has not recommended prosecution even once 
(following the district attorney’s non-prosecution decision). The office did 
concur in two prosecutions of such cases but neither individual was 
convicted. The Iowa legislature has recently given the Attorney General 
formal statutory authority to engage in these reviews.49 In a recent case 
involving allegations by protesters against the Des Moines police, the 
protesters have filed civil lawsuits alleging multiple federal and state 
violations of law by the police in connection with demonstrations related to 
the George Floyd case.50 It is not clear that any disciplinary action was 
undertaken against the officers responsible for the claimed violations, but 
that seems unlikely. In another tragic case, Wisconsin announced in 
January, 2021 that under procedures similar to Iowa’s, prosecutors had 
decided not to pursue charges against police in connection with the death of 
Jacob Blake.51 
What can one conclude from Iowa’s and Wisconsin’s thin record? It is 
not implausible to believe that Iowa and Wisconsin (maybe because much 
of those states is thinly populated) that rural and semi-rural areas may 
produce fewer cases of excessive force. But it may also be that other, less 
 
48.   Only Two Officers Charged for Force Since ’04, DES MOINES REG. col 4, p. 1C, Dec. 26, 
2020; Officer Involved Critical Incident, WISCONSIN DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dci/officer-involved-critical-incident [https://perma.cc/U73X-4W26]; 
Jason Stein, Wisconsin DOJ Issues First Full Guidelines for Investigating Fatal Police Shootings, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 17, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2017/05/21/wis
consin-doj-issues-first-full-guidelines-investigating-fatal-police-shootings/331053001/ 
[https://perma.cc/GLH9-RH96]. 
49.   See DES MOINES REG., supra Note 49. 
50.   Lawsuits Accuse Police of Using Excessive Force, DES MOINES REG. Dec. 27, 2020, col. 
1, at 1C. 
51.   See Kenosha News Staff, Photos: Peaceful Protest Follows No Charges Being Filed in 





















exculpatory, explanations could be the case. Rural police tend to arrest 
people outside of the presence of disinterested witnesses and generally do 
not have body cams.52 It seems implausible that since 2004 there are ZERO 
cases of excessive force by police in Iowa.   
During the summer of 2020, New York enacted a series of police 
reforms and one state senate bill (A1601c/S02574-C) that creates an Office 
of Special Prosecutor for Police-Involved Deaths.53 It is odd that this Office 
is limited to cases of death. Another piece of legislation in the same package 
(A10002B/S3595) requires the New York Inspector General and the Port 
Authority Inspector General to investigate “allegations of corruption, fraud, 
use of excessive force, criminal conflicts of interest, or abuse by officer 
agencies.”54 The United States’ experience with special prosecutors at the 
state and federal level does not leave me sanguine that this provision, as 
shown in Iowa, will change the outcomes with respect to excessive force 
claims under the substantive criminal law; but, it is hard to imagine that this 
innovation will hurt. By contrast, the Inspector General and Port Authority 
provisions strike me as likely to generate evidence which might well lead to 
more prosecutions. 
One might expect California to move to deal with allegations of 
excessive police force. In its most recent legislative session, the State did 
enact some police reform measures.55 California is one of five states that has 
no procedure to decertify a police officer following a determination that 
they committed serious misconduct by using excessive force.56 The state 
legislature refused to enact a measure that would have allowed this. It also 
declined to make public disciplinary records of police officers accused of 
racist or discriminatory acts, have a history of wrongful arrests and searches. 
etc.57 Interestingly, New York moved to repeal such shielding of 
 
52.   See generally Concerns of Rural Law Enforcement: What We Heard From the Field, U.S. 
DEPT’T OF JUST: DISPATCH (2019), https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/09-2019/rural_le.html.  
53.   India L. Sneed, New York State Police and Criminal Justice Reforms Enacted Following 
George Floyd’s Death, GREENBERG TRAURIG (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2020/6/new-york-state-police-and-criminal-justice-reforms-
enacted-following-george-floyds-death [https://perma.cc/DGB9-G9A9].  
54.   Id.  
55.   See KUSI NEWS SAN DIEGO, supra note 39.  
56.   Id.  
57.   Id. The Legislature did pass two modest reforms. First, it amended the California 
government code to require that all localities amend their use of force policies to prohibit the use of a 
“carotid restraint or choke hold.” A.B. 1196, 2019-20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020), CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
7286.5 (West 2021). It also amended the Government code with respect to officer involved shootings to 

















disciplinary records of police officers, firefighters, correction officers, and 
peace officers.58 As another example, New Jersey’s (appointive) Attorney 
General has moved aggressively by rulemaking to inhibit, review, and act 
on excessive force by police officers.59 Finally, a few states, curiously 




I want to return to a significant issue I mentioned earlier: whether the 
changes I propose (and others made elsewhere) are premised on a belief that 
there is a vast structural racist cast to our criminal laws and our policing. I 
am personally not certain about this, but I think that a decent respect61 for 
the opinion of our African-American citizens requires all of us to treat this 
claim seriously and to act on it. Racial and/or ethnic animosity and suspicion 
is common in societies. Ireland, Scotland, France, China, the Balkans, and 
Malaysia all provide numerous examples of sustained communal tensions 
based on race, religion, national origin, and other differences. It would be 
implausible to think that such tensions and suspicious do not manifest 
themselves in some ways in the United States’ criminal justice system, not 
just in policing, but in charging and sentencing as well.  
I do not believe that there is any one silver bullet to cure or eradicate 
the effects of racial animosity in our criminal justice system. But it does 
seem to me that it is appropriate given the enormity of the social divide62 on 
 
require a report and to authorize an investigation by a local prosecutor or the Attorney General of 
California of any shooting by a police officer that causes the death of an unarmed civilian. A.B. 1506 
2019-20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020), CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12525.3 (West 2021). 
58.   See KUSI NEWS SAN DIEGO, supra note 39. 
59.   Russell Berman, The Nation’s Most Ambitious Police Reform Launches Today, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/12/new-jersey-police-
reform/617436/ [https://perma.cc/D36C-VCS3]. 
60.   See STEPHENS, supra note 5. For a comprehensive list of police changes and reforms 
across the United States, the most common being the banning of chokeholds, see Changes to Policing 
Policy in the States and 100 Largest Cities, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_policing_policy_in_the_states_and_100_largest_cities,_2020 
[https://perma.cc/3XQQ-H47Q]. 
61.   See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776); transcript available at 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript [https://perma.cc/E3R6-79T2]. 
62.   See Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, The Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves: 
Racial Disparities and the Persistence of Inequality in the Criminal Justice System, 27 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 183 (2018); but see Michael Siegel, Racial Disparities in Fatal Police 


















this and the pervasiveness throughout history of such feelings to act in a 
way that should both respond in particular cases and also to seek to 
ameliorate those suspicions. When President Truman wisely desegregated 
the Armed Forces in 1948, it was argued that this would exacerbate racial 
tension and distrust that existed in the Army. It is true that Truman’s act did 
not eliminate racial tension, but it is widely believed that it helped to reduce 
it.63  
As I conclude, it is fair to ask why we, as a society, should embark on 
such significant changes in policing when the statistical case showing 
widespread purposeful discrimination or other injustice in policing is 
lacking.64 The answer is that our constitutional order has as its very first 
principle an abhorrence of the wrongful exercise of executive power in 
policing.65 Our notions of due process and habeas corpus are premised on 
the idea that state coercion can only occur when there is a convincing legal 
justification. Every instance of the use of excessive force is right at the heart 
of our fears of tyranny and oppression. Whatever might be said about the 
data about the use of excessive force and the other forms of wrongful 
exercise of the criminal justice system it, at least, raises such a serious 
question that a response is not only possible but is required.  
Maybe the best thing that can come of what I propose is some sense of 
amelioration. But that itself is a good thing. And as a society we owe it to 
the family of William Chapman and others like him whose lives have been 
lost or made more difficult by excessive force. But we also owe it to all 
victims of excessive force without regard to race to act. And finally, we owe 
our police a redesigned structure of police organization that will improve 




63.   Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). 
64.   See generally Fryer supra note 20. 
65.   See MASS. CONST. pt. the first, https://malegislature.gov/laws/constitution 
[https://perma.cc/C6GA-6DUM]. 


















Washington University Open Scholarship
